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Abstract
This paper is about the role of interpersonal comparisons in Harsanyi’s aggregation
theorem. Harsanyi interpreted his theorem to show that a broadly utilitarian theory of
distribution must be true even if there are no interpersonal comparisons of well-being.
How is this possible? The orthodox view is that it is not. Some argue that the interper-
sonal comparability of well-being is hidden inHarsanyi’s premises. Others argue that it
is a surprising conclusion of Harsanyi’s theorem, which is not presupposed by any one
of the premises. I argue instead that Harsanyi was right: his theorem and its weighted-
utilitarian conclusion do not require interpersonal comparisons of well-being. The key
to making sense of this possibility is to treat Harsanyi’s weights as dimensional con-
stants rather than dimensionless numbers.
1 Introduction
Harsanyi (1955) claimed to derive “an additive cardinal social welfare function” from prin-
ciples of individual and social rationality and respect for rational preferences. According to
Harsanyi’s aggregation theorem, if both individual and social preferences satisfy the axioms
of expected utility theory, and if society prefers anything that is preferred by all individuals,
then society’s preferences can be represented as maximizing a weighted sum of individual
utilities.
*I am very grateful to Matthew Adler, Harvey Lederman, Ralph Wedgwood, John Weymark, and an au-
dience at the 2021 Virtual Conference on Social Choice Theory and Applications for helpful comments and
discussion.
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Harsanyi doesn’t call this social welfare function “utilitarian”—at least, not in that paper.
But he went on to interpret it that way, claiming his theorem “to show that the Bayesian
rationality postulates, together with a very natural Pareto optimality requirement, logically
entail a utilitarian ethic” (Harsanyi 1978: 226)—surprisingly, “even if interpersonal utility
comparisons are not admitted” (228).
This is puzzling, not least because utilitarianism would typically be taken to require
“everybody to count for one, nobody for more than one” (Mill 1863). The conclusion of
Harsanyi’s theorem is compatible with the assignment of different weights to different peo-
ple. But let us set this worry aside. What puzzles me is how any form of broadly utilitarian
aggregation, weighted or otherwise, could be possible without interpersonal comparisons of
well-being. If we cannot even compare the well-beings of different individuals, how can we
sensibly add them up, even after weighting them? The orthodox answer of social choice the-
ory is that this is impossible: “weighted utilitarianism requires interpersonal comparisons
of utility gains and losses” (Blackorby, Donaldson, and Weymark 2008: 138).
The puzzle deepens when we compare Harsanyi’s theorem to an evenmore foundational
result of social choice theory: Arrow’s impossibility theorem. Arrow (1950) showed that a
social choice procedure that delivers an ordering for all possible arrangements of individual
preferences, respects the unanimous preferences of individuals, and ranks any two alter-
natives only by considering individuals’ preferences between those alternatives must be a
dictatorship, in which one person’s preferences always prevail. Arrow worked in a purely
ordinal framework in which utilitarianism could not even be formulated. But Sen (1970)
and others have extended the result to informational settings that include cardinally mea-
surable utilities. And the standard lesson of these results is that “admitting cardinality of
utilities without interpersonal comparisons does not change Arrow’s impossibility theorem
at all” (Sen 1999: 357).
Harsanyi admits that the “use of cardinal utilities is insufficient to enable us to avoid
Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem” (Harsanyi 1979: 303). And he seems to accept Arrow’s
conditions when formulated in terms of individual utility functions. How, then, could he
have possibly derived a weighted utilitarian social welfare function in a way that “does not
depend on the possibility of interpersonal utility comparisons” (Harsanyi 1979: 294)? This
is the question I want to explore in this paper.
The general consensus appears to be that, at least when Harsanyi’s conditions are sup-
plemented in such a way that they support weighted utilitarianism, his result does require
interpersonal comparisons. Some argue that the possibility of interpersonal comparisons
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is presupposed by one of Harsanyi’s premises (Broome 1991). Others argue that it is a sur-
prising conclusion of Harsanyi’s theorem (Mongin 1994; Jeffrey 1971). I will argue instead
that Harsanyi was right: his theorem and its weighted-utilitarian conclusion do not require
interpersonal comparisons of well-being. The key idea is to understand Harsanyi’s weights
not as real numbers but rather as dimensional constants. Defending this thesis will require
us to rethink some core ideas in the theory of social choice and welfare. In doing so, I will
argue that the standard lesson drawn from Sen’s extension of Arrow’s theorem is mistaken.
But, first, we need to get Harsanyi’s theorem on the table.
2 Harsanyi’sTheorem
Consider a set of outcomes X = {x1, . . . , xm}. A lottery over these outcomes assigns an
(“objective”) probability to each outcome in such a way that the probabilities sum to one.
We can harmlessly treat outcomes as if they were lotteries since, for each outcome, there is a
degenerate lottery that guarantees that outcome. Where p is a lottery and xj is an outcome,
pj is the probability assigned by p to xj.
We have a fixed population of individuals, numbered 1, . . . ,n. For each individual i,
there is a relation ≻i of being better for i—i’s betterness relation—over the set of all lotteries.
Let ≻ (no subscript) denote the “overall” betterness relation. (Harsanyi interprets ≻i as i’s
preference relation and ≻ as a social preference relation. I follow Broome 1991, Dreier 2004,
and others in reinterpreting these as betterness relations for the sake of generality. But the
question of this paper is especially important on Harsanyi’s preference-theoretic interpreta-
tion, because it is especially controversial whether interpersonal comparisons are possible
in such a framework; see, e.g., Hausman 1995; Greaves and Lederman 2018.)
Harsanyi’s theorem has three premises. The first is that each individual’s betterness rela-
tion has an expected utility representation. A real-valued function ui(⋅) represents i’s better-
ness relation just in case it assigns higher numbers to lotteries that are better for i—i.e., for
any lotteries p and q: p ≻i q iff ui(p) > ui(q). We call ui(⋅) a utility function for i’s betterness
relation. An expectational utility function is one with the following property: the number it
assigns to any lottery p is the expected value of ui(⋅) over p’s outcomes (which, recall, we are
treating as degenerate lotteries). That is,
ui(p) = p1ui(x1) + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + pmui(xm) (1)
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An expectational utility function is unique up to positive affine transformation—i.e., multi-
plication by a positive number and addition of a constant. If ui(⋅) is an expectational utility
function that represents i’s betterness relation, then for any positive α and any β, i’s better-
ness relation can also be represented by vi(⋅) = αui(⋅)+ β, which will also be expectational.1
Harsanyi’s second premise is that the overall betterness relation has an expected utility
representation. This means that there is a social welfare functionW(⋅), unique up to positive
affine transformation, that assigns higher numbers to better lotteries—i.e., p ≻ q iff W(p) >
W(q)—and is expectational:
W(p) = p1W(x1) + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + pmW(xm) (2)
Harsanyi’s third premise is
Strong Pareto If one lottery is at least as good for each person as another, then it is at least
as good overall. If, in addition, it is better for someone, then it is better overall.
Harsanyi’s theorem is that, if these premises are true, there are positive real numbers
(weights) k1, . . . , kn such that, for any lottery p:
W(p) = k1u1(p) + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + knun(p) (3)
This means that the overall betterness relation can be represented as maximizing the expec-
tation of a weighted sum of individual utilities, where those utilities expectationally repre-
sent the individuals’ betterness relations.
We now have Harsanyi’s aggregation theorem on the table. Notice that none of the
premises seems to require interpersonal comparisons of well-being. For reasons that will
be explained in the next few sections, however, equation (3) does not necessarily express a
utilitarian principle of aggregation—and not just because the weights can differ by person.
To get closer to a utilitarian conclusion, we need some additional assumptions.
3 Goodness and Utility
A (weighted) utilitarian is typically thought to believe that there is some quantity—goodness
for a person, or well-being—the (weighted) sum of which ought to be maximized. What is
1Harsanyi uses Marschak (1950)’s variation on the axioms of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947). It
does not matter for his theorem which axiomatization is used, so long as it provides an expected utility repre-
sentation.
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the relation between this quantity and an expected utility representation of an individual’s
betterness relation?
Tomark this distinctionmore clearly, let “gi(p)” denote the goodness of lottery p for per-
son i—for brevity, i-goodness. I use boldface to indicate that this symbol does not designate
a number. It is important to distinguish between a dimensioned quantity and the number
used by a particular scale to represent that quantity.2 My mass is 75 kg. This quantity is
not a number. What is a number is the ratio of this quantity to the mass of the standard
kilogram—i.e., the number assigned by the kilogram scale to my mass (75). Something’s
goodness for a person is not a number. The question is whether, and in what sense, it can
be represented by a number, such as the value of an expectational utility function.
We can assume that, for any lotteries p and q, p’s goodness for i is greater than q’s just in
case p is better for i than q: gi(p) > gi(q) iff p ≻i q. Harsanyi’s first premise was that ≻i has an
expected utility representation. So there is a utility function ui(⋅) that represents ≻i, in the
sense that p ≻i q iff ui(p) > ui(q). Thus, ui(⋅) assigns a higher number to one of two lotteries
just in case its goodness for i is greater: gi(p) > gi(q) iff ui(p) > ui(q). In this sense, ui(⋅)
provides an ordinal scale of i-goodness.
Intuitively, we can make comparisons not only of i-goodness, but also of differences in i-
goodness. One thingmight bemuch better for you than another, whereas a third thingmight
be only slightly better. Let “gi(p)−gi(q)” denote the difference in i-goodness between p and
q—i.e., howmuch better p is for i than q. (OnHarsanyi’s preference-theoretic interpretation,
this can be thought of as the strength of i’s preference between p and q.) Harsanyi’s premises
do not imply that there are such differences, but let’s assume that there are. What is the
relation between differences in i-goodness and differences in ui-utility?
We might think that differences in ui-utility represent differences in i-goodness, in at
least the following sense:
gi(p) − gi(q) > gi(r) − gi(s)⇔ ui(p) − ui(q) > ui(r) − ui(s) (4)
But this does not follow from the assumptionsmade so far. We have assumed, withHarsanyi,
that ≻i has an expected utility representation. But this doesn’t mean, and the axioms of ex-
pected utility theory do not imply, that ≻i can only be represented by an expectational utility
function. To see this, suppose that we apply an order-preserving but nonaffine transforma-
2I try to remain neutral about controversial issues in themetaphysics of quantities (see, e.g., Dasgupta 2013;
Eddon 2013; Sider 2020; Wolff 2020). I assume that any plausible theory of quantities should be compatible
with the claims I want to make about them here (or suitable reinterpretations of those claims).
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tion to each ui(⋅). For example, let vi(⋅) be the square of ui(⋅): vi(p) = [ui (p)]2 for each
lottery p. (Assume that ui(⋅) only assigns nonnegative numbers.) vi(⋅) still represents the
ordering ≻i, in the sense that p ≻i q iff vi(p) > vi(q). But this representation is not expecta-
tional. It instead has the less convenient form:
vi(p) = (p1
√





None of our assumptions so far rule out the possibility that vi(⋅) represents differences in
i-goodness, in the following sense:
gi(p) − gi(q) > gi(r) − gi(s)⇔ vi(p) − vi(q) > vi(r) − vi(s) (6)
Suppose that (6) is true. Then (4) cannot also be true: ui-differences and vi-differences






The difference between ui(x) and ui(w) is greater than the difference between ui(z) and
ui(y). But the difference between vi(x) and vi(w) is less than the difference between vi(z)
and vi(y). The two scales cannot both represent differences in i-goodness.
To see why this matters for Harsanyi’s purposes, suppose that (6) is true, as is compatible
with Harsanyi’s premises. Suppose we accept the conclusion of Harsanyi’s theorem, that
overall betterness can be represented by an expectational social welfare function of the form




v1(p) + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + kn
√
vn(p) (7)
In terms of vi-utilities, this is not a weighted utilitarian representation but a weighted pri-
oritarian one: each person’s vi-utility has diminishing marginal value with respect to social
welfare. If vi-differences represent differences in goodness for i, then Harsanyi’s theorem
would imply that a difference in goodness for i matters more the worse off i is. To rule out
this prioritarian interpretation, Harsanyi needs some reason to privilege the family of expec-
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tational representations rather than nonaffine transformations thereof. This is the influential
Sen (1977)–Weymark (1991) critique of Harsanyi’s theorem (for responses, see Risse 2002;
Fleurbaey and Mongin 2016; Greaves 2017).
To address this problem, I will attribute another assumption to Harsanyi, which Broome
(1991) calls
Bernoulli’s Hypothesis For any lotteries p and q, p is better for i than q just in case p’s
expectation of goodness for i is greater than q’s.
This principle strengthens Harsanyi’s first premise, that each person’s betterness relation has
an expected utility representation. Bernoulli’s Hypothesis implies that ui(⋅) represents dif-
ferences in i-goodness, so that (4) is true and (6) is false. More than this, it implies that
there are meaningful ratios of goodness differences, for any given person. These ratios are
represented by expectational utility functions, in the sense that
gi(p) − gi(q)
gi(r) − gi(s)
= ui(p) − ui(q)
ui(r) − ui(s)
(8)
Such ratios are preserved by any positive affine transformation of ui(⋅). In this sense, ui(⋅)
is a cardinal scale of i-goodness. For example, the Celsius scale is a cardinal scale of tem-
perature. Let T(x) denote the temperature of an object x, and let TC(x) denote the number
that represents x’s temperature on the Celsius scale. The ratio of two differences in degrees
Celsius is the ratio of two differences in temperature:
T(a) − T(b)
T(c) − T(d)
= TC(a) − TC(b)
TC(c) − TC(d)
(9)
And this ratio is preserved by any positive affine transformation of the Celsius scale (e.g.,
the Farenheit scale).
The addition of Bernoulli’sHypothesis rules out the prioritarian interpretation ofHarsanyi’s
conclusion. But how close does it take us to utilitarian aggregation?
4 Summation
Broome (1991) claims that, given Bernoulli’s Hypothesis, the conclusion of Harsanyi’s the-
orem implies
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Summation For any lotteries p and q, p is better than q just in case the sum of the differ-
ences in goodness for each person between p and q is positive:
[g1 (p) − g1 (q)] + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + [gn (p) − gn (q)] > 0 (10)
There are two reasons to doubt this. One is the removal of Harsanyi’s weights. The other
is that differences in goodness for different people are being summed. Let’s start with the
second.
We have assumed that intrapersonal comparisons of goodness, differences in goodness,
and ratios of differences in goodness are meaningful—indeed, more than this, that ratios
of differences in goodness for a person are real numbers. But we have not assumed the
meaningfulness of interpersonal comparisons of any kind. And Summation could hardly be
true unless we can compare differences in goodness for different people. We cannot add up
quantities that cannot even be compared. There is no quantity that is the sum of my mass
and your height because these are quantities of different dimensions. We can of course add
the number that represents my mass on the kilogram scale and the number that represents
your height on the inches scale; this operation is not the addition of mass and height, but of
relatively arbitrary dimensionless numbers. Summation presupposes that we can add differ-
ences in goodness across people; goodness is not a number, nor are differences in goodness.
Such quantities must be interpersonally comparable in order for this operation to make
sense.
Summation presupposes that interpersonal comparisons of differences in goodness are
meaningful. But we have not explicitly assumed that such comparisons are meaningful. So
how could Broome have obtained Summation from Harsanyi’s conclusion and Bernoulli’s
Hypothesis?
Broome suggests that the possibility of interpersonal comparisons is hidden inHarsanyi’s
premises. Harsanyi’s second premise was that the overall betterness relation has an expected
utility representation. This implies the completeness of the overall betterness relation: that,
for any lotteries p and q, either p is better than q, q is better than p, or p and q are equally
good. In other words, there are no “gaps” in overall betterness. But, according to Broome
(1991: 220), “If one person’s good cannot be compared with another’s, then the general bet-
terness relation will simply not be complete.” So, Broome claims, Harsanyi has assumed the
possibility of interpersonal comparisons after all.
If Broome means that the absence of interpersonal comparisons would by itself rule out
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completeness, that is clearly false. Without further assumptions, the overall betterness rela-
tion could have nothing to do with individual betterness relations. It could rank lotteries in
terms of expected quantities of cheese; the absence of interpersonal comparisons of good-
ness would be no barrier to the completeness of the resulting ranking. Even if we require
overall betterness to be a function of individual betterness relations, by imposing a Pareto
condition, it is still wrong. One counterexample is amajoritarian betterness relation: one al-
ternative is better than another just in case the first is better for at least as many people as the
second is; two alternatives are equally good just in case each is better than the other for the
same number of people. Or consider a serial dictatorship: person 1’s betterness relation de-
termines which of any two alternatives is better overall unless they are equally good for her,
in which case person 2’s betterness relation determines it unless they are equally good for
her, and so on; two alternatives are equally good just in case they are equally good for each
person. These rules violate other conditions required for an expected utility representation,
but they satisfy completeness and are paradigm cases of rules that do not require interper-
sonal comparisons of well-being. They do involve comparisons of the moral significance of
different people’s well-beings: the majoritarian treats every gain or loss in well-being as hav-
ing equal moral significance, no matter whose well-being it is or how much is gained or lost;
a dictatorship treats gains and losses for the dictator as having greater moral significance
than gains and losses for everyone else. But these are not interpersonal comparisons of well-
being: the majoritarian need not insist that every gain or loss to each person is of the same
size; dictatorship does not entail that the dictator gains more well-being from any change
that is better for her than anyone else could possibly gain or lose. Since these rules satisfy
completeness but do not require interpersonal comparisons of well-being, it is not clear why
completeness in particular should be picked out as smuggling in the possibility of interper-
sonal comparisons. Nor does this possibility seem to be implied by any of Harsanyi’s other
premises. So it is hard to see how Harsanyi’s premises and Bernoulli’s Hypothesis could
together imply Summation.3
We will return to this issue soon. For now, let us turn to our other question about
Broome’s purported derivation of Summation: the disappearance of Harsanyi’s weights.
Here is what happens to Harsanyi’s weights in Broome’s attempt to derive Summation.
Start with the conclusion of Harsanyi’s theorem: overall betterness can be represented as
maximizing a weighted sum of utilities representing individual betterness relations, as in
3I think the later Broome (2004) would agree, since he distinguishes differences in goodness for a person
from differences in overall good, and recognizes a need to justify the possibility of interpersonal comparisons.
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equation (3): W(p) = k1u1(p) + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + knun(p). Broome’s strategy proceeds in two steps. The
first is to normalize each person’s utility function so that the weights are equal. Recall that an
expected utility representation is unique up to positive affine transformation. And observe
that, for each individual i, the function vi(⋅) = kiui(⋅) is a positive affine transformation of
ui(⋅). We can rewrite equation (3) in terms of an unweighted sum:
W(p) = v1(p) + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + vn(p) (11)
The second step is to move from (11) to Summation via Bernoulli’s Hypothesis. Bernoulli’s
Hypothesis implies that each person’s expectational utility function represents her good on
a cardinal scale. So “the total of people’s utilities will measure the total of people’s good”
(Broome 1991: 218). Since the sum of these utilities represents the overall betterness rela-
tion, equation (11) seems to imply Summation.
These two steps, however, rely on inconsistent assumptions about interpersonal compar-
isons. Suppose first that interpersonal comparisons of goodness differences are not mean-
ingful. Then the second step of the argument is not valid. Equation (11) entails that there is
some scale of goodness for person 1, some scale of goodness for person 2, and so on, such
that the overall betterness relation can be represented by the sum of the numbers on these
scales. But if interpersonal comparisons are not meaningful, then we cannot infer from this
representation that overall betterness is represented by the sum of goodness for different
people. Consider an analogy. There is some scale of height, some scale of mass, and some
scale of temporal duration such that the number that represents your height on that scale
plus the number that represents your mass on that scale equals the number that represents
your age on that scale. We cannot conclude from this that your age is, or is even represented
by, the sum of your height and your mass, since there is no such quantity as the sum of your
height and your mass. Moving from equation (11) to Summation is like that. It takes a sum
of numbers, each of which represents a magnitude of some distinct quantity on indepen-
dent scales, to represent the sum of the various quantities represented, which is not even
well-defined.
Suppose next that interpersonal comparisons of goodness differences are meaningful,
and in particular that they are represented by the expectational utility functionsu1(⋅), . . . ,un(⋅).
Then the first step of the argument is not valid. For if the weights in equation (3) are
distinct—i.e., if ki ≠ kj for some i and j—then the transformations used to cancel out the
weights will use different scale factors. So the interpersonal comparisons of goodness differ-
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ences represented by u1(⋅), . . . ,un(⋅)will change when those representations are normalized
to yield an unweighted sum in terms of v1(⋅), . . . , vn(⋅). Consider another analogy. Suppose
we have a collection of two apples and ten oranges, where each apple has the same mass and
each orange has the same mass. Letmg(a),mg(o), andmg(c) denote the mass in grams of a
single apple, a single orange, and the collection of apples and oranges respectively:
mg(c) = 2mg(a) + 10mg(o)
Suppose we cancel out the “weights” by converting the scale of apple-mass to half-grams and
the scale of orange-mass to decigrams:
mg(c) = mg/2(a) +mg/10(o)
We obviously cannot infer from this that the mass of the collection is the sum of the mass of
one apple and themass of one orange, because we are no longer representing apple-mass and
orange-mass on the same scale. Broome’s strategy is something like this, in moving from
equation (3) to (11). It takes a bunch of numbers, each of which represents a magnitude
of some quantity (goodness for a person) on the same scale, and converts those numbers
independently onto values of different scales. But the new utility scales will not in general
preserve the interpersonal comparisons represented by the original ones, so we cannot take
the new unweighted representation to represent the same thing as the original weighted
representation.
As far as I can see, there is no way to get Summation fromBernoulli’s Hypothesis and the
conclusion ofHarsanyi’s theoremalone. For if the expectational utility functionsu1(⋅), . . . ,un(⋅)
convey interpersonal information, that information will not be preserved by individual-
specific rescalings that deliver an unweighted representation. And if they don’t convey such
information, then we cannot infer that the sum of utilities represents a sum of goodness
across people, since the latter will not even be meaningful.
5 Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
What does Bernoulli’s Hypothesis add to Harsanyi’s conclusion, then, if it does not get us to
Summation? A natural thought would be that it implies
Number-Weighted Summation There are positive real numbers k1, . . . , kn such that, for
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any lotteries p and q: p is better than q just in case the weighted sum of the differences
in goodness for each person between p and q is positive:
k1 [g1 (p) − g1 (q)] + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + kn [gn (p) − gn (q)] > 0 (12)
There are two reasons to doubt this.
First, each term in this summation—ki [gi (p) − gi (q)]—is a difference in goodness for
i. So this doctrine, too, is meaningful only if differences in goodness for different people are
comparable. But, again, we have not assumed that they are.
Second, none of our assumptions so far imply that the weight of each person is fixed, in
the following sense. Harsanyi’s conclusion is that, given an expected utility representation
of person 1’s betterness relation, an expected utility representation for person 2’s better-
ness relation, and so on, there are weights k1, . . . , kn such that the overall betterness relation
can be represented as maximizing the sum of utilities so weighted. But suppose we swap
some individual i’s utility function with a positive affine transformation that shrinks or ex-
pands the differences in i’s utility between outcomes, leaving everyone else’s utility function
unchanged. Then if we used the same set of weights, the original betterness ordering may
fail to maximize the sum of utilities so weighted. To preserve the overall betterness order-
ing, we’d need to change the social welfare function by adjusting the weight on i’s utilities.
This seems strange, because there is supposed to be nothing special about i’s original utility
function, and—if interpersonal comparisons of well-being are not assumed—no important
connections between the utility functions of different individuals. As Weymark (1991: 281)
puts it, “Simply because new utility representations have been adopted, society behaves as if
it has changed the way it aggregates individual utilities.”
Both problems are addressed by an extension of Harsanyi’s theorem due to Mongin
(1994). Mongin proves a version of Harsanyi’s theorem for what Sen (1970) calls social wel-
fare functionals. A social welfare functional assigns an overall betterness ordering to each
possible profile of utility functions. A profile U is a list of utility functions, one for each in-
dividual: U = (ui (⋅) , . . . ,un (⋅)). We are concerned here only with profiles of expectational
utility functions. If we specify each person’s utility function, the social welfare functional
will deliver a ranking of lotteries. If we feed it a different profile of utility functions, it will
give us a (possibly different) ranking. The social welfare functional does not itself, however,
change from profile to profile.4
4For helpful overviews of the social welfare functional literature, see Adler (2019), Bossert and Weymark
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There are two reasons towant a social welfare functional rather than amere social welfare
function such as Harsanyi’s. The first is that we want a way to compare alternatives that does
not depend on how the individual betterness facts are represented. Harsanyi’s conclusion
does not provide that, as we have seen.
The second reason has to do with non-representational changes in the individual better-
ness facts. This reason is most compelling in the original preference-theoretic framework of
Harsanyi. People can change their preferences, and it would be nice to have a way to com-
pare alternatives that is invariant with respect to such changes. Harsanyi’s theorem does not
provide that, since the weights can change when new utility functions are used. This con-
sideration is harder to translate when we are concerned with individual betterness relations,
since we might think the individual betterness facts to be necessary truths. But, on some
theories of prudential value, what is good for a person can depend on some contingent or
temporary matters—e.g., a person’s values, projects, or relationships. It seems desirable to
have a way of comparing alternatives that is compatible with such views and is robust to
changes in such matters. We might also want to consider multiple profiles given our uncer-
tainty about the individual betterness facts.
Harsanyi stated his theorem in a single-profile framework. So the weights in his con-
clusion depend on the particular utility functions we use to represent each person’s bet-
terness ordering, and on what that ordering happens to be. To extend Harsanyi’s theorem
to the multi-profile setting of social welfare functionals, Mongin adds an independence of
irrelevant alternatives condition. To introduce this condition, take any two profiles U =
(ui (⋅) , . . . ,un (⋅)) and V = (vi (⋅) , . . . , vn (⋅)). Say that U and V coincide on two alterna-
tives just in case each person’s utility function assigns the same value to those alternatives
in both profiles. That is, U and V coincide on p and q just in case, for every individual i:
ui(p) = vi(p) and ui(q) = vi(q). Say that the overall betterness relations assigned to U and
V agree on two alternatives just in case they rank those alternatives the same way—that is,
p ≻U q iff p ≻V q, where ≻U and ≻V denote the overall betterness relations assigned by the
social welfare functional to U and V respectively. According to
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives If twoprofiles coincide on two alternatives, then
the overall betterness relations assigned to those two profiles must agree on those two
alternatives.
This means that changes to people’s utility functions that preserve the values assigned to
(2004), d’Aspremont and Gevers (2002), and Weymark (2016).
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particular alternatives cannot change—because they are irrelevant to—the social ranking of
those particular alternatives. In the context of Harsanyi’s theorem, Independence of Irrel-
evant Alternatives prohibits the weights from depending on the particular profile of utility
functions to be evaluated. For if the weights differed by profile, then one could find a pair of
alternatives on which two profiles coincide, with the weighted sums of those pairs differing
between the two profiles. So the overall betterness relations assigned to those two profiles
would disagree on those alternatives, since Harsanyi’s other conditions require overall bet-
terness to be representable as maximizing the weighted sum of utilities. Independence of
Irrelevant Alternatives rules out this possibility.
Let us, for now, treat Independence of IrrelevantAlternatives as if it were one ofHarsanyi’s
official premises. He seems to accept it in Harsanyi (1979: sec. 6). We will revisit this ad-
dition in section 9. Until then, by “Harsanyi’s premises” I mean his original premises plus
Bernoulli’s Hypothesis and Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives.
When added to Harsanyi’s other conditions, Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
allows Mongin to derive a social welfare functional with the following property. There are
positive real numbers k1, . . . , kn such that, for any profile U, and any lotteries p and q:
p ≻U q⇔ k1 [u1 (p) − u1 (q)] + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + kn [un (p) − un (q)] > 0 (13)
The weights, importantly, do not vary from profile to profile.
If we assume Bernoulli’s Hypothesis, then the ui-difference for each person represents
the difference in goodness for each person. And the weights on these differences do not
depend on the particular utility functions we use. This seems to entail Number-Weighted
Summation. This is puzzling, though. Number-Weighted Summation requires interper-
sonal comparisons of differences in goodness. And we have not assumed such comparisons
to be possible.
Mongin and d’Aspremont (1998) suggest that the possibility of interpersonal compar-
isons is a surprising conclusion of the theorem, not (as Broome claimed) an assumption of
it. To explain why they think this, we need to undertand how interpersonal comparability
is typically understood in the framework of social welfare functionals.
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6 Invariance Conditions
What does it mean for interpersonal comparisons of differences in goodness to bemeaning-
ful? An important tradition in the theory of measurement understands meaningfulness in
terms of invariance. As Roberts (1984: 71) puts it, “A statement involving numerical scales
is meaningful if and only if its truth (or falsity) remains unchanged under all admissible
transformations of all the scales involved.” Suppose, for example, that the temperatures of a
and b are such that the Celsius scale assigns a number to a that is twice the number assigned
to b: TC (a) = 2TC (b). Can we infer that the temperature of a is twice the temperature of
b: T(a) = 2T(b)? No, because the Farenheit scale will assign different values to a and b so
that the statement is not true on that scale: TF (a) ≠ 2TF (b). Since the Farenheit scale is an
admissible transformation of the Celsius scale, we are supposed to conclude that statements
about temperature ratios are not meaningful. Statements about ratios of temperature differ-
ences are, though, because the numerical representations of such ratios are invariant under
all admissible transformations. This is what makes Celsius and Farenheit cardinal scales.
The idea of invariance as a criterion for meaningfulness is typically made precise, in
social choice theory, by conditions that require invariance of the social welfare functional to
certain kinds of transformations on utility profiles. Suppose we have two profiles of utility
functions U = (u1(⋅), . . . ,un(⋅)) and V = (v1(⋅), . . . , vn(⋅)). The idea is that, if U and V are
related in a certain way, then they contain the same meaningful information about the good
of individuals, in much the same way that the Farenheit and Celsius scales represent the
same facts about temperature. If U and V are so related, then any differences between them
are mere artefacts of the utility representation, much like ratios between numbers assigned
by the Celsius scale. The social welfare functional should therefore assign the same overall
betterness relation to U and V.
For example, suppose that each person’s good is only ordinally measurable and that we
cannot make interpersonal comparisons of any kind. If i-goodness is only ordinally mea-
surable, the only significant feature of ui(⋅) is the order in which it ranks alternatives. This
feature is preserved by any order-preserving transformation of ui(⋅). And if we cannot com-
pare the good of different individuals, then admissible transformations of different people’s
utility functions need not preserve any comparisons between individuals, since such com-
parisons are not supposed to be meaningful. So we should be able to apply different trans-
formations for different people without changing the overall betterness ordering.
To make this precise, consider a profile U = (u1(⋅), . . . ,un(⋅)). And consider a list of
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order-preserving transformations φ = (φ1(⋅), . . . ,φn(⋅)). Each φi takes a utility function
and returns another utility function that preserves the ordering of alternatives for i. Let
φ(U) = (φ1(v1(⋅)), . . . ,φn(vn(⋅)). If utility is only ordinally measurable and not interper-
sonally comparable, then U and φ(U) are informationally equivalent. If the social welfare
functional must assign the same betterness relation to informationally equivalent profiles,
then we have
Intrapersonal Ordinal Invariance For any profiles U and V, if there is some list of order-
preserving transformations φ = (φ1, . . . ,φn) such that V = φ(U), then ≻U and ≻V
must agree on all alternatives.
This means that, if two profiles are such that each person’s utility function in one profile is
some (possibly distinct for each person) order-preserving transformation of her utility func-
tion in the other profile, then those two profilesmust be assigned the same overall betterness
relation.
Intrapersonal Ordinal Invariance is extremely restrictive. It yields the informational
framework of Arrow (1950), who worked with profiles of preference orderings rather than
utility functions. In the terminology of social welfare functionals and individual betterness
relations, Arrow’s theorem can be stated as follows. Consider a social welfare functional that
assigns an overall betterness ordering to every possible profile of utility functions. Suppose
that this social welfare functional satisfies Intrapersonal Ordinal Invariance, Independence
of Irrelevant Alternatives, and
Weak Pareto If one alternative is better for each person than another, then the first must
be better than the second.
Then, according to Arrow’s theorem, the social welfare functional must be dictatorial: there
must be some individual such that, whenever an alternative is better for her, it is better
overall.
Suppose instead that goodness for each person is cardinally measurable, but still not
interpersonally comparable. A cardinal scale is unique up to positive affine transforma-
tion. Consider again profile U = (u1(⋅), . . . ,un(⋅)). And consider a list of functions φ =
(φ1(⋅), . . . ,φn(⋅)), where this time each φi is a positive affine transformation: for each i,
there is some positive αi and some βi—each of which may be different for each person—
such that φi(ui) = αiui + βi. If each person’s good is only cardinally measurable and not
interpersonally comparable, then U and φ(U) would seem to contain the same meaningful
information. This yields
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Intrapersonal Cardinal Invariance For any profiles U and V, if there is some list of pos-
itive affine transformations φ = (α1u1 + β1, . . . ,αnun + βn) such that V = φ(U), then
≻U and ≻V must agree on all alternatives.
Can we avoid Arrow’s impossibility by weakening the invariance requirement from Intrap-
ersonal Ordinal Invariance to Intrapersonal Cardinal Invariance? Sen (1970) showed that
the answer is no: Intrapersonal Cardinal Invariance and Independence of Irrelevant Alter-
natives together imply Intrapersonal Ordinal Invariance, so the addition of cardinal infor-
mation makes no difference in avoiding dictatorship.
We are now in a position to understand Mongin and d’Aspremont’s suggestion with
which we ended section 5. A weighted utilitarian social welfare functional violates Intraper-
sonal Cardinal Invariance. This can be seen by picking a set of weights and then blowing up
one person’s utility function, leaving others’ unchanged, so that maximizing the weighted
sum leads to a different ordering. But if interpersonal comparisons of goodness differences
were not meaningful, then Intrapersonal Cardinal Invariance would have to be true. So
Harsanyi’s premises, when translated to the multi-profile setting, together seem to imply
that such comparisons must be possible.5
I now want to argue, though, that this impression is misleading: Intrapersonal Cardinal
Invariance does not follow from the view that well-being is cardinally measurable but not
interpersonally comparable.
7 Luce’s Principle
We have seen that, when translated to the multi-profile setting of social welfare functionals,
Harsanyi’s conditions violate Intrapersonal Cardinal Invariance. My question is whether
Harsanyi’s conditions must therefore imply, as Mongin and others have assumed, that in-
terpersonal comparisons of differences in goodness are possible. I argue that they don’t.
This may seem downright confused. If each person’s utility function represents her bet-
terness relation on a cardinal scale, then any positive affine transformation of that scale
5Here is another way to see the point. Suppose we deny the possibility of interpersonal comparisons and
therefore try to add Intrapersonal Cardinal Invariance to Harsanyi’s other conditions. These include Indepen-
dence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Strong Pareto, which entails Weak Pareto. A simple extension of Arrow’s
theorem shows that the only social welfare functional compatible with Intrapersonal Cardinal Invariance, In-
dependence of Irrelevant Alternatives, and Strong Pareto is a serial dictatorship (Luce and Raiffa 1957; Gevers
1979). But a serial dictatorship is incompatible with expected utility theory for the overall betterness relation
(specifically, with the continuity axiom). Since we cannot add Intrapersonal Cardinal Invariance to Harsanyi’s
other conditions, this seems to show that Harsanyi’s conditions entail interpersonal comparability.
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should represent her betterness relation just as well; and if differences in goodness for differ-
ent people cannot be compared, then it should hardly matter whether we apply the same or
different admissible transformations to different people’s utility functions. To insist other-
wise would be like insisting that, upon switching from grams to kilograms when measuring
mass, one must also switch from meters to kilometers when measuring distance. And that
would be absurd. This is why Intrapersonal Cardinal Invariance seems to follow from the ab-
sence of interpersonal comparisons, and therefore why Harsanyi’s violation of Intrapersonal
Cardinal Invariance seems to imply that interpersonal comparisons must be meaningful.
More generally, it seems that if our numerical representation of some relation is unique
up to certain kinds of transformations, then it should not matter which numerical repre-
sentation within that family of transformations we use. This is because all representations
within that family preserve the samemeaningful statements about that relation. If we explain
the meaningfulness of various comparisons in terms of the admissible class of transforma-
tions in this way, it seems to follow that the social welfare functional must be invariant to
that admissible class of transformations. Otherwise, the overall betterness relation delivered
by the social welfare functional would seem to objectionably depend on an arbitrary (and
indeed meaningless) artefact of how individuals’ betterness relations are represented. So, if
Harsanyi’s premises entail that the social welfare functional is not invariant to independent
affine transformations of different people’s utility functions, then this must be because they
require interpersonal comparisons to be meaningful.
This reasoning implicitly appeals a more general principle due to Luce (1959: 85). Ac-
cording to
Luce’s Principle “Admissible transformations of one ormore of the independent variables
shall lead … only to admissible transformations of the dependent variables.”
To see what this means, consider a law that reports the value of some dependent variable y
in terms of independent variables x1, . . . , xn:
y = f(x1, . . . , xn) (14)
For example, ymight be the value of a social welfare function that represents overall better-
ness, and the x’s might be the values of individual utility functions that represent goodness
for each person. Now suppose, for each i, that φi is an admissible transformation of xi—in
our case, a positive affine transformation. Then, according to Luce’s Principle, there must
18
be some admissible transformation ψ of the dependent variable such that
ψ(y) = f(φ1(x1), . . . ,φn(xn)) (15)
And so, by equation (14):
ψ(f(x1, . . . , xn)) = f(φ1(x1), . . . ,φn(xn)) (16)
When the independent variables are values of utility functions that represent interpersonally
noncomparable differences in goodness, and the dependent variable is the value of a social
welfare function that represents the overall betterness relation, this implies Intrapersonal
Cardinal Invariance, since an admissible transformation of the social welfare function must
at least be order-preserving.
Luce’s Principle, however, is false, at least in this unqualified form—as Luce (1962) came
to agree. Consider some radioactive material whose mass decays exponentially with time
(Rozeboom 1962). Suppose that the material weighs 10 kg at some initial time, and that its
mass in kilograms m at any time t minutes later is the value of the following function:
m(t) = 10e−t/2 (17)
Since mass and temporal duration are both ratio-scale measurable, Luce’s principle implies
that a similarity transformation applied to the measure of time should yield some similarity
transformation in the measure of mass. That is, for any positive α, there must be some
positive β such that, for any value of t:
βm(t) = 10e−αt/2 (18)
And so, by equation (17):
β10e−t/2 = 10e−αt/2 (19)
or more simply:
β = e(1−α)t/2 (20)
But the only α for which there is such a fixed β is α = 1—i.e., the identity transformation.
In all other cases, the value of e(1−α)t/2 varies with the time variable t. So, if we fix a trans-
formation α ≠ 1—say, 1/60, as when converting from minutes to seconds—there will be
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no similarity transformation from mass-in-kilograms to mass-in-some-other-unit that will
preserve the ratios of mass numbers assigned for all values of t.
The problem posed by this sort of example is that Luce’s Principle need not hold for
laws that contain dimensional constants. The law represented by equation (17) contains two
dimensional constants: the initial mass of the material and the rate of decay. The latter is
responsible for the violation of Luce’s Principle. Their role and dimensionality is clearer
if we express the law as a relation between the underlying dimensioned quantities rather
than numbers on a scale representing those quantities. Using boldface letters to represent
dimensioned variables:
m(t) = (10kg)e−t/(2minutes) (21)
where t is an amount of time and m(t) is the mass of the material that amount of time later
than the initial time. Now suppose we want to represent equation (21) with numbers rather
than dimensioned quantities. Our choice of scale for mass does not constrain our choice of
scale for time, since these quantities are of independent dimensions. But, when selecting a
numerical representation of (21), our choice of scale for a dimensioned variable does con-
strain our choice of scale for any constant of that dimension. Our original representation
(17) obeys this constraint when we interpret the variable t as numbers of minutes and m as
numbers of kilograms, since the dimensional constants 2minutes and 10kg are represented
by the numbers 2 and 10 respectively. When we change the representation by applying an
admissible transformation to the independent variable—i.e., multiplying t by α—we must
apply the same transformation to the constant 2, since 2 is supposed to represent a quantity
of the same dimension as t. And, similarly, we should expect the resulting transformation
of the dependent variable to be applied also to the constant of the same dimension. Thus,
what we should expect is that, for any positive α, there is some positive β such that, for any
number of minutes t:
βm(t) = β10e−αt/(2α) (22)
And this is equivalent to equation (17). When we take care to apply the same transforma-
tions to the numbers representing dimensional constants as we apply to the numerical vari-
ables representing quantities of those dimensions, then the resulting requirement is trivially
satisfied. This is consistent with Roberts’s criterion for meaningfulness, which requires in-
variance “under all admissible transformations of all the scales involved” (emphasis added),
including scales for dimensional constants.
Luce (1959: 93)’s interpretation of this situation is that dimensional constants “cancel
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out” any change in scales. Rozeboom (1962: 545) suggests that this “amounts to nothing
but a more or less arbitrary selection of one of the admissible scalings of that variable, and
then working up an ‘absolute’ interpretation for that scale.” This may give the impression
that the underlying quantities are themselves representable on an absolute scale. But this
would be misleading. It is true that dividing a duration of time t by the constant 2minutes
yields a value that does not depend on the scale on which time is measured. But the ratio
t/(2minutes) is not a time; it is a dimensionless number. The exponent of a decay law is
indeed measurable on an absolute scale, because exponents are numbers and cannot have
dimension. But, for that very reason, the exponent of a decay law is not the value of a scale for
time or other dimensioned quantity. Similarly, the ratio ofm(t) to 10 kg does not depend on
the unit of measurement, and the only admissible transformation of this ratio is the identity
transformation, so we have an absolute scale of something. But it’s not an absolute scale of
mass. It’s an absolute scale of the ratio of some mass to 10 kg; that ratio is not itself a mass,
but a dimensionless number.
8 Harsanyi’s Weights as Dimensional Constants
We have seen that the inference from cardinal noncomparability of well-being to Intraper-
sonal Cardinal Invariance is an instance of Luce’s Principle, with individual utilities as the
independent variables and social welfare as the dependent variable (which is assumed to be
at least ordinally measurable). And we have seen that Luce’s Principle is not valid for laws
that contain dimensional constants. InNebel (2021) I argue thatmany theories of social wel-
fare should be taken to appeal to such constants (though my discussion there is restricted to
ratio-scale measurability with full interpersonal comparability). My suggestion here is that
Harsanyi’s weights should be understood as dimensional constants.
Recall that we are assuming Bernoulli’s Hypothesis. So there is more than mere ordinal
structure to betterness for an individual. There are differences in goodness for an individual.
We can treat goodness for an individual, then, as a dimensioned quantity, much as we treat
temperature. Ratios of differences in goodness, for a given individual, are real numbers.
To reflect the absence of interpersonal comparisons, we will treat goodness for one per-
son and goodness for another person as quantities of different dimensions. Much as lengths
and masses cannot be added together, differences in goodness for different people cannot
be added together. This reflects the familiar point that, in the absence of interpersonal com-
parisons of goodness, the sum of different people’s utilities does not represent a meaningful
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quantity.
The weighted sum of differences in goodness, however, may be a meaningful quantity,
if the weights are dimensional constants. To illustrate this, consider an example involving
more familiar dimensions that we antecedently know to be independent. Suppose that the
price of a car is an additive function of its mass and its volume, where the price is linear with
respect to each variable. A simple model of this would be to assign a price to each unit of
mass and a price to each unit of volume and to add the price of a car’s total mass and the
price of its total volume to obtain its overall price. Let p(x) be the price of car x, m(x) its
mass, andV(x) volume. Let λp/m be a constant of dimension [p]/[m] (e.g., $n per kilogram)
and λp/v a constant of dimension [p]/[V] (e.g., $m per cubic meter). Then, on this model
we have
p(x) = λp/mm(x) + λp/vV(x) (23)
Equation (23) does not involve the meaningless operation of adding mass to volume. It
convertsmass tomoney and volume tomoney, via the dimensional constants, and then adds
two quantities of money—which are all perfectly meaningful operations. This does not treat
quantities of mass as comparable to quantities of volume: there are no comparisons of the
form m(x) > V(x).
We can now return to the conclusion of Harsanyi’s theorem. As stated on page 11,
Number-Weighted Summation requires interpersonal comparisons of goodness differences,
which we have assumed not to be meaningful. But it can be easily reformulated not to re-
quire such comparisons.
We have assumed, via Bernoulli’s Hypothesis, that there are such things as ratios of dif-
ferences in goodness for a person. We havemade no analogous assumption for overall good-
ness. For this reason, we will not treat social welfare as a dimensioned quantity, and overall
betterness will be treated as an ordinal notion. But it would be easy to extend the following
remarks if there is such a quantity.
In the ideology of dimensioned quantities, we can state Harsanyi’s desired conclusion as
follows:
Quantity-Weighted Summation There are positive differences in goodnessk1, . . . ,kn such
that, for any lotteries p and q: p is better than q just in case
[1/k1] [g1 (p) − g1 (q)] + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + [1/kn] [gn (p) − gn (q)] > 0 (24)
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Each person’s difference in goodness is weighted by the reciprocal of some constant differ-
ence in goodness for her. Each term in the summation is a real number: the ratio of each
person’s difference in goodness to that constant. One lottery is better than another just in
case the sum of those ratios is positive. (If we accept Bernoulli’s Hypothesis for overall good-
ness and want a “cardinal” version of Quantity-Weighted Summation, each weight should
be the ratio of some difference in overall goodness to some difference in goodness for each
person—i.e., the “rate” by which increments of i-goodness increase overall goodness, anal-
ogous to the dimensional constants in equation (23)—so that the weighted sum is a total
difference in overall goodness.)
Quantity-Weighted Summation requires no interpersonal comparisons of goodness dif-
ferences. It only requires intrapersonal ratio comparisons of goodness differences, which are
meaningful if Bernoulli’s Hypothesis is correct, and the uncontroversially meaningful oper-
ation of adding real numbers. By way of analogy, equation (23) for the price of a car does
not require interdimensional comparisons of masses and volumes. It only requires ratios of
money to mass, of money to volume, and sums of money.
We can think of Quantity-Weighted Summation as a generalization of utilitarianism. If
interpersonal comparisons are meaningful, then we can treat each person’s good as a quan-
tity of the same dimension, making the constants k1, . . . ,kn comparable. Utilitarians accept
a version ofQuantity-Weighted Summation inwhich ki = kj for all individuals i and j. In that
case, Quantity-Weighted Summation compares alternatives in the same way as Summation.
But, when interpersonal comparisons are ruled out and each person’s good is treated as a
quantity of a distinct dimension, it is not even meaningful to say that two people’s weights
are equal, or that one person’s weight is greater than another’s. It would be like comparing
the gravitational constant to the speed of light.
When Harsanyi’s weights are understood as constants of distinct dimensions, it is clear
why we should not expect Intrapersonal Cardinal Invariance to hold. Suppose that we fix a
utility scale ui(⋅) for each individual and represent overall betterness with an expectational
social welfare function W(⋅) that satisfies equation (3): W(p) = k1ui(p) + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + knun(p). A
scale for each individual determines a particular number to represent the weight ki. For ex-
ample, if ki = gi(p)− gi(q), then let ki = 1/ [ui(p) − ui(q)] (though this should not be taken
to suggest that each person’s weight must be the difference in goodness for her between
some alternatives that are actually in the domain under consideration). Intrapersonal Car-
dinal Invariance would require, in accordance with Luce’s Principle, that any combination
of admissible transformations of each individual’s utility scale result in at least an order-
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But this is not in general possible if all the ki’s must be positive, as Strong Pareto requires.
(For example, let p be better for person 1, and let q be better for everyone else. Then we can
find some sufficiently large α1 and sufficiently small α2, . . . ,αn such that p comes out better
overall. But we can also find some sufficiently small α′1 and sufficiently large α′2, . . . ,α′n such
that p comes out worse.)
As we have seen, however, Luce’s Principle is false precisely because it fails to account for
the role of dimensional constants. If the weights k1, . . . ,kn are dimensional constants rather
than dimensionless numbers, then we should only expect an admissible transformation of
the utility scales to yield an admissible transformation of the social welfare function given a
corresponding admissible transformation of the weights. Remember that a choice of scale
for i-goodness determines a number to represent ki. If ki represents person i’s weightwhenui
represents i’s betterness relation, then ki/αi will represent i’s weight when αiui+βi represents
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As in the example of radioactive decay from section 7, when we take care to apply the same
transformations to the numbers representing constants of i-goodness as we apply to the nu-
merical variables representing i-goodness, then the social welfare function meets Roberts’s
criterion of invariance “under all admissible transformations of all the scales involved.” Note
that the dimensional constants do not themselves change when we use a different scale for
each person’s good; only their numerical representations change.
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What does this imply for the standard utilitarian practice of representing a person’s good
by a utility function and comparing alternatives by their sums of utilities? If interpersonal
comparisons of well-being are meaningful, this is no problem. But if interpersonal compar-
isons of well-being are not meaningful, then this is an error. It is like adding up a person’s
mass-in-grams and her height-in-inches and taking the resulting sum to represent a sig-
nificant quantity. This error is not avoided by multiplying people’s utilities by a fixed set
of numerical weights, because the appropriate weights depend on the scale used to measure
each person’s well-being. If wemeasure i-goodness in i-shmutils instead of i-utils, one needs
to convert the number used to represent i’s weight from i-utils−1 to i-shmutils−1, in order to
preserve the overall betterness ranking of alternatives.
I have suggested that Harsanyi’s weights be understood as dimensional constants and
differences in goodness for each person as dimensioned quantities. This makes Quantity-
Weighted Summation possible even without interpersonal comparisons of well-being. This
violates Intrapersonal Cardinal Invariance, but we have seen that Intrapersonal Cardinal In-
variance does not follow from the cardinal measurability and interpersonal noncomparabil-
ity of well-being when the social welfare function can contain dimensional constants. Since
Harsanyi’s weights can plausibly be interpreted as dimensional constants, we should not
expect it to satisfy Intrapersonal Cardinal Invariance and cannot conclude that Harsanyi’s
theorem requires interpersonal comparisons of well-being.
One might object that Quantity-Weighted Summation does require such comparisons,
since the dimensional constants convert each person’s difference in goodness onto the same
(dimensionless) scale. But each person’s weighted difference in goodness is not, on my in-
terpretation, a difference in goodness for a person. It is the ratio of two differences in good-
ness, which (given Bernoulli’s Hypothesis) is a real number. If comparing such ratios were
all it took to make interpersonal comparisons of goodness, then such comparisons would
be guaranteed so long as each person’s good is measurable on a cardinal scale. Indeed, if
that were all it took, then we could make comparisons of arbitrary quantities of different
dimensions. Of course we can compare the ratio of my velocity to the speed of light and the
ratio of my mass to yours, but this does not mean that velocities and masses are comparable.
I do not claim that Quantity-Weighted Summation is the view that utilitarians have
meant by “weighted utilitarianism,” or that there is anything incoherent about Summation
or Number-Weighted Summation. They would be incoherent if interpersonal comparisons
of well-being were impossible. But I do not believe they are, and neither did Harsanyi. My
claim, rather, is that theorists who accept Harsanyi’s premises while rejecting interpersonal
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comparisons of well-being should accept Quantity-Weighted Summation. Harsanyi wanted
to show that even a skeptic about the possibility of interpersonal comparisons could be led,
by his theorem, to a broadly utilitarian principle of aggregation. Quantity-Weighted Sum-
mation is the concusion to which they are led.
Of course, Quantity-Weighted Summation is not really utilitarian: it does not compare
alternatives by their sums of well-being. But neither is Number-Weighted Summation. They
both have formal features that are characteristically utilitarian: social welfare is an additively
separable function of individual well-beings, and each person’s well-being has constant, pos-
itive marginal value. It is a merely verbal question whether we classify Quantity-Weighted
Summation as sufficiently close to utilitarianism to count as what Harsanyi called “a utili-
tarian ethic.” But Quantity-Weighted Summation is certainly closer to utilitarianism than
critics have thought Harsanyi could get—and perhaps as close as he could possibly get—
without interpersonal comparisons of well-being.
9 Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives Revisited
I have suggested that Harsanyi’s desired conclusion can be formulated in a way that does
not require interpersonal comparisons of well-being: namely, as Quantity-Weighted Sum-
mation. There is a problem, however. In section 5, we added Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives to the stock of Harsanyi’s premises. But Quantity-Weighted Summation vio-
lates Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. More generally, if we appeal to dimensional
constants in a way that leads to violations of Luce’s Principle, then Independence of Irrele-
vantAlternativeswill not be satisfied. This is because the comparison of alternatives depends
on more than the numbers assigned by each person’s utility scale to each alternative: it also
depends on the numbers assigned to dimensional constants. These numbers can change de-
pending on the utility scales, though the constants they represent do not. This is an instance
of a point due to Morreau and Weymark (2016): the Independence condition requires the
comparison of two alternatives to depend only on the assignment of utilities to those alter-
natives, even when those utilities represent different quantities of well-being.
To see this, suppose that there are only two people. And suppose that each person’s
weight ki is fixed at the value 1 i-util, where an i-util is some arbitrary difference in good-
ness for i. It is the difference in i-goodness between lotteries to which some utility func-
tion ui(⋅)—the i-util scale—assigns numbers that differ by 1. Now consider a utility profile
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Since we have stipulated that each person’s weight is the difference in goodness between
alternatives to which ui(⋅) assigns consecutive integers, we can conclude that g1(p)−g1(q) =
k1 and g2(q) − g2(p) = k2, so the weighted sum of differences in goodness for each person
between p and qwill be zero. Quantity-Weighted Summation implies, then, that p and q are
equally good. Now suppose we swap out person 1’s utility function for another that assigns
the samenumbers to p and q, while changing themeaning of these numbers. Imagine that the
difference in goodness for person 1 between p and q is increased by a factor of a thousand,
but let us represent this difference using a “kilo-util” scale v1(⋅) that assigns the number




Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives implies that this new profile must be assigned the
same overall betterness ordering as the original, so p and qmust still be equally good in this
new profile. But Quantity-Weighted Summation implies that p is now better than q, since
the difference in goodness for person 1 between p and q is now a thousand times the weight
k1, and the difference in goodness for person 2 between q and p has stayed equal to k2, so
the weighted difference for person 1 is greater than for person 2. Thus we have a violation
of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives.
However, this violation of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives seems unobjection-
able. The intuition that motivates Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives is that the com-
parison of two alternatives should depend only on how good those alternatives are for each
person. Other alternatives are irrelevant, as are other features of the alternatives beyond
their goodness for each person, in the sense that the goodness of each alternative for each
person is the only variable on which the overall betterness relation depends. The violation
due to dimensional constants is not like that. It’s not as if the comparison of p and q de-
pends on how good some third alternative r is for each person, or on some feature of the
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alternatives beyond their goodness for each person.
One might insist that it does, since I am interpreting Harsanyi’s weights as differences
in goodness for each person. But the weights are constant and need not be interpreted as
the difference in goodness between some special pair of alternatives.6 Perhaps there is some
independent reason to think that overall betterness should not depend on any dimensional
constant. This would rule out much more than just Quantity-Weighted Summation (Nebel
2021; see also Skow 2012). But, even if we are convinced that there are no such constants,
we should distinguish that consideration from the sorts of consideration that motivate In-
dependence of Irrelevant Alternatives, and have them reflected in independent principles.
We introduced Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives to prevent Harsanyi’s weights
from varying by profile. It was important to consider multiple profiles for two reasons. One
was to ensure we could compare alternatives in a way that did not depend on the particular
utility representation of individual betterness relations. The other was to let us compare
alternatives in a way that did not depend on the particular betterness facts. This second
reason was more controversial, since it is not clear that the individual betterness facts are
contingent or temporary matters. But they might be on certain views of well-being, and on
Harsanyi’s preference-theoretic interpretation this consideration seems especially pressing.
For the sake of generality, let’s assume that the individual betterness facts can change, not
just our numerical representations of those facts. We can incorporate this idea by consider-
ing multiple profiles of individual goodness functions rather than utility functions. So far we
have been interpreting gi(p) as the goodness for person i of lottery p. Let’s instead interpret
it as the goodness for i of p according to the dimensioned profile G = (g1(⋅), . . . , gn(⋅)). We
can think of each dimensioned profile as a possible assignment of distributions of goodness
for each person. One profile might say that p’s goodness for i is 1 i-util while another says
that it is 2 i-utils.
Now think of a social welfare functional as a function from dimensioned profiles of in-
dividual goodness functions to overall betterness relations. We can then simply reinterpret
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives accordingly. Two dimensioned profiles G and G′
coincide on p and q just in case, for each person i, p is just as good for i according toG as it is
for i according toG′—i.e., gi(p) = g′i(p)—and likewise for q. When reinterpreted in terms of
dimensioned quantities of goodness, Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives requires the
betterness relations assigned to two profiles to agree on two alternatives whenever those
6In contrast to, for example, the maneuver in Gauthier (1986) to divide each person’s difference in utility
by her maximum gain, since introducing a superior alternative can change the maximum gain.
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profiles coincide on those alternatives. This principle captures the idea that the comparison
of alternatives should depend only on how good those alternatives for each person. Given
this principle, the dimensional constant reflecting each person’s weight cannot change as
the individual goodness facts change; only its numerical representation can change.
This is just a sketch of how the Independence condition can be made compatible with
Quantity-Weighted Summation. A much more detailed alternative to the orthodox frame-
work of social welfare functionals has been proposed by Morreau and Weymark (2016).
They introduce a framework of “scale-dependent” social welfare functionals, in which each
person’s utility function is paired with a scale that tells us what each utility number repre-
sents. This allows them to reformulate the standard axioms inways that take into account the
units in which welfare is measured. They do not consider the role of dimensional constants,
so the relation between their framework and the approach suggested here is not entirely
clear. I believe that my main claims can be stated in their framework, but I leave open the
exact relationship between the two approaches as a question for further research.
On the approach suggested here, as in Morreau and Weymark’s framework, invariance
conditions such as Intrapersonal Cardinal Invariance do not follow immediately from the
measurability/comparability possibilities with which they are typically associated. Unlike
profiles of utility functions, dimensioned profiles of individual goodness functions can dif-
fer only if there is a difference in how good some alternative is for someone. Transformations
of individual goodness profiles are real changes in how good things are for people (this is
not to imply that any such change is possible, since the domain of possible profiles may
be limited). Without the further assumption that there are no dimensional constants, we
cannot infer that the overall betterness ordering should be invariant to any class of such
changes merely from the fact that our numerical representation of well-being can be ad-
missibly transformed in such ways. As Morreau and Weymark argue, the standard Inde-
pendence of Irrelevant Alternatives condition fails to distinguish between real changes in
well-being and merely representational changes. Since there plainly is such a distinction,
it is no objection to Quantity-Weighted Summation that it violates Independence of Irrele-
vant Alternatives as standardly formulated. The reformulation suggested here, in terms of
dimensioned profiles of individual goodness functions, respects that distinction while also
meeting the purpose to which the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives is put inMongin’s
extension of Harsanyi’s theorem.
We cannow seewhy the standard lessondrawn fromSen’s extension ofArrow’s theorem—
that we need interpersonal comparisons of well-being to satisfy the Arrovian desiderata—is
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mistaken. Quantity-Weighted Summation is a counterexample. It assigns an overall bet-
terness ordering to every possible profile of individual goodness functions, in a way that
satisfies Weak Pareto, is non-dictatorial, and depends, for any pair of alternatives, only on
how good those alternatives are for each individual. Even though it violates Intrapersonal
Cardinal Invariance, it does not require interpersonal comparisons of well-being. In a way,
the mistake I am attributing to Sen and others is much like the mistake that Sen finds in
Harsanyi, which led us to introduce Bernoulli’s Hypothesis in section 3: he conflates a per-
son’s well-being with a utility function that represents her well-being. Cardinal measurabil-
ity is sufficient to escape Arrow’s impossibility when we treat each person’s well-being as a
dimensioned quantity and allow for the possibility of dimensional constants.
10 Conclusion
I have argued that, when Harsanyi’s weights are interpreted as dimensional constants, his
aggregation theorem does not require interpersonal comparisons of well-being. But where
do these dimensional constants come from? Harsanyi (1955: 316) suggested that, in the
absence of interpersonal comparisons, the choice of weights must be arbitrary and depend
onour “personal value judgments.” In laterwork, however, Harsanyi argued that his theorem
supported the possibility of interpersonal comparisons via the process of selecting weights.
He claimed that an evaluator cannot avoid such comparisons,
as long as he wants to choose the coefficients … of his social-welfare function
… in a rational manner. This is so because the only way that individual i can
judge how much relative weight a given set of coefficients … actually assigns
to each individual’s interests is by converting all n individuals’ utility functions
… into the same utility unit—which, of course, involves making interpersonal
utility comparisons. (Harsanyi 1977: 81)
Harsanyi’s idea is that a rational procedure for selecting the weights must look something
like this: we decide whose well-being is more important, whose is less important, and come
up with a set of weights that reflect those comparisons. But, in order to tell whether a set of
weights assigns more or less importance to one person’s good than to another’s, we must use
utility functions that represent their good on the same scale.
The argument of this paper casts doubt on Harsanyi’s suggestion. The proponent of
Quantity-Weighted Summation need not start out with, or ever make, judgments about
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whose well-being is more or less important. Compare the car pricing analogy: we do not
start out with judgments about whether mass or volume should be more expensive; such
a comparison would not even make sense. We can instead select differences in well-being
for each person that seem, upon reflection, to be equally important from a moral or social
perspective. We need not claim that these are well-being differences of the same size, any
more than setting the price-per-unit-volume and price-per-unit-mass of a car requires us to
say that some unit of volume equals some unit of mass. We should distinguish comparisons
of different people’s well-being from comparisons of the moral or social significance of their
well-being. Harsanyi’s theorem requires that the latter are meaningful, but so do dictatorial
and majoritarian social welfare functionals. It is one thing to say that a benefit to me is more
important than a benefit to someone else—quite another to say that the first is larger than
the second. (This is especially clear in the original preference-theoretic version of Harsanyi’s
theorem, since there is no obvious conceptual connection between the strength of a person’s
preferences and the social or moral weight of a preference of that strength.)
My argument also bears on the debate over the relevance of Harsanyi’s theorem to utili-
tarianism. When confronted with Harsanyi’s conclusion, it is natural to wonder why all the
weights shouldn’t just be equal. Why should some people’s well-being receive greater weight
than others’? This, I suspect, is what makes Broome’s leap to Summation from Harsanyi’s
conclusion and Bernoulli’s Hypothesis seem tempting: we naively assume that the weights
are dimensionless numbers and see no reason to assign different numbers to different peo-
ple. In the absence of interpersonal comparisons, however, the weights cannot all be equal—
not because some people’s weights must be greater than others’, but rather because they are
quantities of distinct dimensions and therefore not even comparable.
The broader lesson of this paper is this. Some of the most important results in social
choice theory appeal crucially to invariance conditions, such as Intrapersonal Cardinal In-
variance, that are supposed to correspond to some natural possibility concerning the mea-
surability and comparability of well-being. These invariance conditions, however, do not
follow from the intended measurability/comparability conditions without the additional as-
sumption that there are no relevant dimensional constants. This does not make these results
any less significant, since the invariance conditions may be natural and interesting enough
even apart from their intended interpretation as straightforward consequences of measur-
ability/comparability conditions. But the additional assumption we have highlighted—that
there are no relevant dimensional constants—warrants at least as much investigation as the
standard questions about measurability and comparability that have occupied much of this
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literature since the work of Arrow and Harsanyi.
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